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reat progress was made in the theory of monetary policy in the
last quarter century. Theory advanced on both the classical and
the Keynesian sides. New classical economists emphasized the
importance of intertemporal optimization and rational expectations.1 Real
business cycle (RBC) theorists explored the role of productivity shocks in
models where monetary policy has relatively little effect on employment
and output.2 Keynesian economists emphasized the role of monopolistic
competition, markups, and costly price adjustment in models where mon-
etary policy is central to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.3 The new neoclas-
sical synthesis (NNS) incorporates elements from both the classical and the
Keynesianperspectivesintoasingleframework.4This“primer”providesanin-
troduction to the benchmark NNS macromodel and its recommendations for
monetary policy.
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The article begins in Section 1 by presenting a monopolistically competi-
tivecoreRBCmodelwithperfectlyﬂexibleprices. TheRBCcoreemphasizes
the role of expected future income prospects, the real wage, and the real inter-
est rate for household consumption and labor supply. And it emphasizes the
role of productivity shocks in determining output, the real wage, and the real
interest rate.
TheNNSmodelintroducedinSection2takescostlypriceadjustmentinto
account within the RBC core. In the NNS model, ﬁrms do not adjust their
prices ﬂexibly to maintain a constant proﬁt maximizing markup. Instead,
ﬁrmsletthemarkupﬂuctuateinresponsetodemandandcostshocks. Markup
variability plays a dual role in the new neoclassical synthesis. As a guide to
pricingdecisions,themarkupiscentraltotheevolutionofinﬂation. Asa“tax”
on production and sales, the markup is central to ﬂuctuations in employment
and output.
Section 3 locates the transmission of interest rate policy to employment
and inﬂation in its leverage over the markup. That leverage creates the fun-
damental credibility problem of monetary policy: the temptation to increase
employment by compressing the markup jeopardizes the central bank’s cred-
ibility for low inﬂation. The nature of the credibility problem is discussed
in Section 3 together with the closely related “inﬂation scare” problem that
confronts monetary policy in practice.
Section 4 traces the effects on employment and inﬂation of three types of
disturbances: optimism or pessimism about future income prospects, a tem-
porary productivity shock, and a shift in trend productivity growth. It then
tells how interest rate policy can counteract such shocks. The combination
of rational forward-looking price setting by ﬁrms, monopolistic competition,
and RBC components in the benchmark NNS model provides considerable
guidance for interest rate policy. The recommended objectives and opera-
tional guidance are developed and presented in Section 5. Section 6 addresses
three challenges to these policy recommendations. Section 7 is a summary
and conclusion.
1. THE CORE REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL
The core monopolistically competitive real business cycle model is presented
in four subsections below: First, the representative household’s optimal life-
time consumption plan is derived, given its lifetime income prospects and
the real rate of interest. Second, household labor supply is derived. Third,
employment and income are determined, taking account of the representative
household’s choice of labor supply, ﬁrm proﬁt maximization, and the econ-
omy’s production technology. Fourth, the real interest rate is determined,
emphasizing its role in clearing the economy-wide credit market and in coor-
dinating aggregate demand and supply.M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 23
Household Consumption5
The economy is populated by households that live for two periods, the present
andthefuture.6 Householdshavelifetimeincomeprospects(y1,y 2)andaccess
to a credit market where they can borrow and lend at a real rate of interest r.
A household chooses its lifetime consumption plan (c1,c 2) given its income
prospects and the real rate of interest to maximize lifetime utility subject to
its lifetime budget constraint
c2 =− (1 + r)c1 + (1 + r)x (1)
where x = y1 +
y2
1+r is the present (period 1) discounted value of lifetime
income prospects.
A household obtains utility from lifetime consumption according to




where u(c1) is utility from consumption in the present, u(c2) is utility from
futureconsumption,U(c1,c 2)isthepresentdiscountedvalueoflifetimeutility
fromconsumption,andρ>0isaconstantpsychologicalrateoftimediscount.
For concreteness we work with log utility: u(c) = log c, so that u (c) = 1/c.
To maximize lifetime utility the household chooses its lifetime consump-
tion plan (c1,c 2) so that




where the household’s choices for c1and c2 exhaust its lifetime budget con-
straint (1).7 Below we see how lifetime income prospects are determined and
how the real interest rate adjusts to reconcile desired aggregate household
consumption with aggregate output.
Household Labor Supply
The representative household must also choose how to allocate its time to
work and leisure. In deciding how much to work, a household takes the real
hourly wage in terms of consumption goods w as given in the labor market.
5 Fisher (1930) and Friedman (1957) pioneered the theory of household consumption.
6As will become clear below, it is not necessary to specify the length of the two periods in
order to explain the mechanics of the forward-looking benchmark NNS model and its implications
for monetary policy. The features of the NNS model highlighted here are qualitatively consistent
with those of a fully dynamic version of the model speciﬁed as a system of difference equations
connecting periods of relatively short duration.
7 To maximize lifetime utility, a household must choose c1 and c2 so that what it requires in
future consumption to forgo one more unit of current consumption, (1+ρ)c2
c1 , equals the interest
rate, 1 + r, at which it can transform a unit of current consumption into future consumption by
lending.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The household has a time budget constraint
l + n = 1( 4 )
wherel istimeallocatedtoleisure,nistimeallocatedtowork,andtheamount
of time per period is normalized to 1. A household gets utility directly from
leisure. Leisure taken in the present and the future contributes to lifetime
utility as does consumption. Again we work with log utility so that utility
from leisure is given by v(l) = logl and v (l) = 1/l.
The allocation of time in a given period that maximizes the household’s
utilityistheoneforwhichthemarginalutilityearneddirectlybytakingleisure
equals the marginal utility earned indirectly by working
1/l = w/c. (5)
Using time constraint (4) to eliminate leisure l in (5) we can express
the household’s willingness to supply labor ns as a function of household
consumption c and the real wage w




Household labor supply (6) has three important features. First, holding
the wage w constant, household labor supply is inversely related to household
consumption. This makes sense because if the household is able to consume
more goods, say, because its lifetime income prospects have improved, then
it will wish to consume more leisure as well. Second, holding consumption
ﬁxed, labor supply varies directly with the real wage. This also makes sense
because,otherthingsthesame,ahigherhourlywageincreasestheopportunity
cost of leisure and makes work more attractive. Third, if both consumption
and the real wage rise equiproportionally, then the effects on labor supply
are exactly offsetting. We see below that this last feature of labor supply is
important to account for some aspects of long-run economic growth.
Firms, Employment, and Output
There are a large number of ﬁrms in the economy, each producing a different
varietyofconsumptiongoods. Becausetheirproductsaresomewhatdifferent,
ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive. Each ﬁrm has enough pricing power
in the market for its own output that it can sustain a price somewhat above
the marginal cost of production. Firms face a constant elastic demand for
their products, which means that the proﬁt maximizing markup of price over
marginal cost is a constant µ∗ > 1, invariant to shifts in demand or in the cost
of production.8 For the remainder of Section 1, we assume that ﬁrms adjust
their prices ﬂexibly to maintain the constant proﬁt maximizing markup µ∗ at
8 This point can be veriﬁed with a little algebra.M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 25
all times. The demand for all varieties of goods is symmetric, so consumption
is treated as a single composite good.
Firms produce consumption goods c from labor input n according to the
production technology
c = a · n (7)
where a is labor productivity per hour in units of consumption goods. Pro-
ductivity a ﬂuctuates and grows over time with technological progress.






in dollars of producing a unit of consumption goods. According to production
technology (7), 1/a hours of work is needed to produce a unit of c. If the
hourly wage is W dollars, then the marginal cost in dollars (unit labor cost) of
producing a unit of consumption goods is W/a. Substituting for MC in the








where w is the real wage.
Note that (9) uses only the production technology and the deﬁnition of
the markup to express the markup µ in terms of productivity a and the real
wage w. We see immediately from (9) that the equilibrium real wage w∗ is
determined as
w∗ = a/µ∗. (10)
If ﬁrms adjust their product prices to maintain markup constancy, the
real wage grows and ﬂuctuates only with productivity a. Since the proﬁt
maximizing markup exceeds unity, µ∗ > 1, the real wage is less than labor
productivity w∗ <a . Firms are content to stop hiring before bidding the real
wage up to the marginal product of labor because they maximize monopoly
proﬁt by restricting their own output somewhat.
To determine equilibrium employment n∗, use (7) and (10) to substitute
for c and w in labor supply function (6)
ns = 1 −
a · n
a/µ∗ (11)




1 + µ∗. (12)26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Notice that equilibrium employment n∗ depends only on the proﬁt maxi-
mizingmarkupµ∗ andnotonproductivitya. Thereasonisthatproductivitya
affects consumption c and the real wage w proportionally given hours worked
n, so that the productivity effects operating through consumption and the real
wage in labor supply function (6) are exactly offsetting. This feature of the
core RBC model is necessary to account for some fundamental facts about
long-run economic growth. For instance, labor productivity in the U.S. econ-
omy has grown by more than 2 percent per year for over 100 years; and output
andtherealwagehavebothgrownatroughlythesamerate. Yetthefractionof
time allocated to work has changed relatively little during that same period.9
Equilibrium output c∗ is determined from production technology (7) and
equilibrium employment (12) as
c∗ = a ·
1
1 + µ∗ (13)
where output c∗ grows and ﬂuctuates proportionally with productivity a.
TheRealInterestRate: CoordinatingDemandwithSupply10
To complete our understanding of the core RBC model, we must check that
households have sufﬁcient income to purchase all the consumption goods that
ﬁrms produce each period and that households can be induced to choose a
lifetime consumption plan that matches the current and future production of
consumption goods. The real interest rate plays the central role in aligning
the demand and supply of consumption goods over time.
Households have two sources of income. First, there is wage income
which equals the real wage multiplied by hours worked, wn. Second, there
is proﬁt income which equals ﬁrms’revenue from sales minus the wage bill,
an−wn. Proﬁtsarepositivebecausew<a . Sincehouseholdsowntheﬁrms,
total household income each period is the sum of wage income and proﬁt
income wn + (an − wn) = an, which is exactly the value of consumption
goodsproducedandsoldeachperiod. Thus,householdsdoindeedearnenough
income each period to buy the goods produced in each period. It follows
that the lifetime consumption plan (c1,c 2) that matches the current and future
supplyofconsumptiongoodsgivenby(13), c∗
1 = a1· 1
1+µ∗ andc∗
2 = a2· 1
1+µ∗,
also satisﬁes the lifetime budget constraint (1).
The real interest rate r∗ that makes desired lifetime consumption match
the intertemporal supply of consumption goods is found by substituting the
9 Romer (1989).
10 Fisher (1930).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 27
current and future supply of consumption goods (c∗
1,c ∗
2) into condition (3)









where we see that the equilibrium real interest rate r∗ varies directly with the
growth of labor productivity,
a2
a1.
One can understand the determination of the real interest rate as follows:
When productivity is stagnant (a1 = a2), households are satisﬁed with a ﬂat
lifetime consumption plan as long as the real interest rate equals the psycho-
logical rate of time preference (r∗ = ρ). In that case, the return to lending
exactly offsets the preference for consuming in the present. On the other
hand, if future productivity is expected to be higher than current productiv-
ity (a1 <a 2), then households want to borrow against their brighter future
income prospects to bring some consumption forward in time. In the aggre-
gate, however, households cannot do so because the future productivity has
not yet arrived. As households try to borrow against the future, they drive
the real interest rate up to the point where they are satisﬁed with the steeply
sloped consumption plan that matches the growth of productivity. The equi-
librium real interest rate clears the economy-wide credit market by making
the representative household neither a borrower nor a lender. In so doing, the
equilibrium real interest rate also clears the economy-wide goods market by
inducing the representative household to spend its current income exactly.
2. THE NEW NEOCLASSICAL SYNTHESIS
The new neoclassical synthesis (NNS) builds on the core real business cy-
cle (RBC) model to provide an understanding of ﬂuctuations in employment
and inﬂation and a framework for thinking about monetary policy. The main
departure is that ﬁrms do not adjust their product prices ﬂexibly in the NNS
model to maintain a constant proﬁt maximizing markup. Consequently, the
markup ﬂuctuates in response to shocks to aggregate demand and productiv-
ity. The remainder of Section 2 explains why markup variability is central
to ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and employment in the benchmark NNS model.
Section 3 discusses how monetary policy exerts its leverage over employment
and inﬂation through the markup. Section 4 considers various shocks in the
NNSmodelandexplainshowinterestratepolicyactionscancounteractthem.
The recommendations for monetary policy implied by the benchmark NNS
model are spelled out in Section 5.
Firm Pricing Practices, Inﬂation, and the Markup
It is costly for a ﬁrm producing a differentiated product to determine the price
that maximizes its proﬁts at each point in time. Pricing requires information28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
on a ﬁrm’s own demand and cost conditions that is costly to obtain. More-
over, that information needs to be assessed and processed collectively by top
management. Management must prioritize pricing decisions relative to other
pressing concerns, so pricing decisions get the attention of management only
every so often.11 Hence, a ﬁrm considers whether to change its product price
only when demand or cost conditions are expected to move the actual markup
signiﬁcantly and persistently away from the proﬁt maximizing markup. For
instance, if higher nominal wages W, or lower productivity a were expected
to compress the markup signiﬁcantly and persistently, then it would be in
the ﬁrm’s interest to consider raising its product price to restore the proﬁt
maximizing markup.
These points can be summarized in four pricing principles:
1) Firms would like to keep their actual markup µ as close to the proﬁt
maximizing markup µ∗ as they can over time, subject to the cost of changing
their product prices.
2) Firms must balance the one-time cost of changing prices against the
beneﬁt of staying close to the proﬁt maximizing markup over time.
3) A ﬁrm is more apt to change its product price to restore the proﬁt
maximizing markup the larger and more persistent it expects a deviation of its
actual markup from the proﬁt maximizing markup to be.
4) Firms move their prices with expected inﬂation on average over time.
The implications of these pricing principles for the economy-wide rate of
inﬂation π may be summarized as follows:
π = INF(µ1,Eµ 2) + Eπ (15)
whereEπ istheexpectedtrendrateofinﬂation,andINF(µ1,µ 2)isafunction
indicating the effect of the current and expected future markup on inﬂation.12
When the current and expected future markup both equal the proﬁt maximiz-
ing markup, then ﬁrms move their prices in accordance with expected trend
inﬂation Eπ, i.e., INF(µ∗,µ ∗) = 0. Markup compression (µ<µ ∗) moves
actual inﬂation above trend inﬂation, and markup expansion (µ>µ ∗) moves
actual inﬂation below trend inﬂation.
We characterize increasingly inﬂationary situations as follows:
A) Absolute Price Stability: µ1 = Eµ2 = µ∗,Eπ = 0. Current and
expected future markups equal the proﬁt maximizing markup, and expected
trend inﬂation is zero.
11 Calvo (1983) models price stickiness by assuming that a ﬁrm gets opportunities to change
its price on a stochastic basis; this accords with the description of price-setting given here.
12 Calvo’s (1983) pricing model yields a forward-looking inﬂation process approximately like
(15). See the discussions and derivations in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Gali and Gertler
(1999), Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001), and Taylor (1999).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 29
B) Low Inﬂation Potential: µ1 <µ ∗,Eµ 2 = µ∗,Eπ = 0. Current
markup is compressed relative to the proﬁt maximizing markup, but the ex-
pected future markup is not, and expected trend inﬂation is still zero.
C) Modest Inﬂation Potential: µ1 <µ ∗,Eµ 2 <µ ∗,Eπ = 0. Markup
compression is expected to persist, but expected trend inﬂation is still zero.
D) Persistent Trend Inﬂation: µ1 = Eµ2 = µ∗,π = Eπ > 0. Current
andexpectedfuturemarkupsareattheirproﬁtmaximizinglevels,butexpected
trend inﬂation is positive.
Employment Fluctuations and the Markup
InﬂationtodayisreasonablylowandstableintheUnitedStatesandaroundthe
developed world. Hence, we consider the nature of employment ﬂuctuations
in the NNS model in terms of situations A and B above. In other words, we
suppose that the current markup may be compressed or elevated relative to
the proﬁt maximizing markup, but ﬁrms do not expect that gap to persist for
very long. And ﬁrms expect zero inﬂation. The central bank is said to have
“credibility for zero inﬂation” in these situations. When the central bank has
credibilityforzeroinﬂation,ﬁrmsaredisinclinedtoraiseorlowertheirproduct
prices in response to a shock to their current markup because they expect the
markupshocktobetemporary.13 Insuchcircumstances,thecurrentpricelevel
P is nearly invariant to current shocks or current monetary policy actions.14
In this case current employment and output are determined by the ag-
gregate demand for goods. The reason is two-fold. First, each ﬁrm faces
a downward sloping demand for its particular variety of consumption good,
and a ﬁrm can sell only as much as households wish to purchase at the going
price. Second, ﬁrms are happy to produce and sell as much as households
are willing to buy because labor productivity exceeds the real wage. Hence,
holding product price constant, proﬁts rise with employment, production, and
sales. Since ﬁrms can’t sell more than demand will allow and ﬁrms are happy
to accommodate demand, aggregate demand governs output in the short run,
and output governs employment given labor productivity.15
We can understand the determination of employment in the benchmark
NNSmodelfromeitheraKeynesianoraclassicalperspective. TheKeynesian
13 Markup shocks are expected to be transitory because monetary policy is expected to make
themso. SeeSections4and5below.
14 The price level is nearly invariant to current economic conditions because ﬁrms choose not
to adjust their product prices to maintain markup constancy. Firms would adjust their prices to
restore markup constancy if they expected that otherwise their markups would deviate persistently
and signiﬁcantly from the proﬁt maximizing markup. Prices are less ﬂexible in the NNS model
the more conﬁdent are ﬁrms that monetary policy will manage nominal cost conditions so as to
maintain their proﬁt maximizing markup without any price adjustments. Hence, credibility for low
inﬂation reinforces price stickiness in the NNS model.
15 Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
transmission mechanism runs from aggregate demand to employment. The
production technology c = an shows how employment n depends on aggre-
gate demand c and labor productivity a. Firms attract enough labor to meet
demand given labor productivity by offering a nominal wage W sufﬁcient to
induce households to supply the required labor input. Since the price level P
is nearly invariant to current economic conditions, the higher nominal wage
raisestherealwagew. Accordingtolaborsupplyfunction(6)givenaggregate
demandc,ahigherrealwageincreaseslaborsupplybyraisingtheopportunity
cost of leisure. When demand falls and ﬁrms need less labor, wages fall since
enough labor supply is forthcoming at a lower real wage.
The classical perspective takes the view that actual employment n must
equal labor willingly supplied by households ns regardless of the strength of
aggregatedemand. Workinginthisdirection, substitutec = anandw = a/µ






From the classical perspective, employment in the NNS model is deter-
minedinverselywiththemarkup,exactlyasinthecoreRBCmodel.16 Theonly
difference is that ﬁrms adjust their prices continually to maintain a constant
proﬁt maximizing markup µ∗ in the ﬂexible price RBC model and markup
constancy stabilizes aggregate employment in that case. When circumstances
are such that the price level P is sticky in the NNS model, however, the
markup ﬂuctuates with the real wage and labor productivity according to (9),
and employment ﬂuctuates as well according to (16).
Employmentvariesinverselywiththemarkupin(16)becausethemarkup
drives a wedge between the price of consumption goods and the marginal cost
of production. In effect, the markup is a percentage sales tax administered by
ﬁrms, the proceeds of which are distributed as proﬁts to households. As is the
case for any tax, a higher tax rate reduces the supply of the good being taxed,
and a lower tax rate expands the supply of that good. Hence, a compressed
markup expands (and a higher markup contracts) the production and sale of
consumptiongoods. Alternatively, recallfrom(9)thatahighermarkupmeans
a lower real wage relative to labor productivity; so the markup also acts like
a tax on labor supply because it drives the real wage below the marginal
product of labor. Thus, the labor market perspective provides another way
of understanding why employment ﬂuctuates inversely with the markup. The
classical perspective is compatible with the Keynesian perspective because
the markup shrinks when the wage rises to attract more labor in order to
accommodate an increase in aggregate demand.
16 Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 31
It is useful to sum up this way: In the ﬂexible price RBC model ﬁrms
neutralize the effect of aggregate demand and productivity shocks on aggre-
gateemploymentbyadjustingtheirpricestomaintainmarkupconstancy. The
ﬂexible price RBC model is classical in the sense that aggregate output is
determined independently of aggregate demand. We saw in Section 1 that
the real interest rate adjusts in the ﬂexible price RBC model to make house-
hold demand for aggregate consumption conform to the aggregate supply of
consumer goods. In the NNS model, ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand can
induceﬂuctuationsinemploymentandoutput. InthatsensetheNNSmodelis
Keynesian. But since the NNS model has the classical RBC model at its core,
we call it the new neoclassical synthesis, recalling Paul Samuelson’s designa-
tion for the original attempt to synthesize classical and Keynesian economics
in the 1950s. Since ﬁrms maintain the proﬁt maximizing markup on aver-
age over time in the NNS model, the NNS model behaves like the ﬂexible
price RBC model on average but with leeway for monetary policy to inﬂuence
aggregate demand and stabilize employment and inﬂation.
3. INTEREST RATE POLICY, CREDIBILITY,
AND INFLATION SCARES
As is common practice, assume that the central bank implements monetary
policy in the NNS model with a short-term nominal interest rate policy in-
strument R. By deﬁnition, the real interest rate r is R − Eπ, the money
interest rate paid or earned on a loan above and beyond the compensation for
expected inﬂation. In practice, a central bank’s inﬂuence over the real interest
rate is limited for two reasons. It exercises direct control of only the nomi-
nal rate. Expected inﬂation is variable, possibly highly variable if the central
bank has little credibility for low inﬂation, so control of the nominal interest
rate translates loosely into control of the real interest rate. Moreover, longer-
term interest rates are what matter for economic activity, and a central bank
inﬂuences long-term interest rates only indirectly via the management of its
short-term nominal interest rate policy instrument. We ignore these important
complications to focus on the essence of interest rate policy in what follows.
In order to understand the mechanism through which interest rate policy
actions are transmitted to the economy, we must ﬁrst specify the context in
whichpolicyisacting. Continuetoassumethatthecentralbankhascredibility
for zero inﬂation so that Eπ = 0 and the price level P is nearly invariant to
current shocks and interest rate policy actions. In this case the central bank’s
choice of nominal interest rate target R translates into a target for the real
interest rate r. Moreover, in this case the public expects the future markup to
be at its proﬁt maximizing level Eµ2 = µ∗. Recall that current and future
productivity (a1, a2) are given by technology, independently of interest rate32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
policy. In this context, (13) says that expected future household consumption




In order to trace the effect of an interest rate policy action on current











1 + µ∗. (17)
Expression (17) reveals the nature of the leverage that interest rate policy
exerts on aggregate demand: Current consumption c1 is inversely related to
the real interest rate target r when expected future consumption is anchored
at a2
1
1+µ∗. An increase in the real interest rate target depresses current aggre-
gate demand by raising the opportunity cost of current consumption in terms
of future consumption. The contraction in aggregate demand is reﬂected in
reduced current employment n1, a low current real wage w1, and an elevated
current markup µ1. Conversely, a cut in the real interest rate target expands
current aggregate demand, raises the real wage, and compresses the markup.
The transmission mechanism can be understood from either the Keynesian
or the classical point of view. From the Keynesian perspective, interest rate
policy exerts leverage over employment and output because production is de-
manddeterminedintheshortrun. Fromtheclassicalperspective,thatleverage
derives from the fact that aggregate demand inﬂuences wages, which in turn
inﬂuencethemarkup,whichbehaveslikeavariabletaxrateintheRBCsetting.
The leverage that interest rate policy actions exert on employment creates
the fundamental credibility problem of monetary policy. The credibility prob-
lemarisesfromabasictensioninthenewneoclassicalsynthesis. Ononehand,
ﬁrms set their prices so as to maintain a proﬁt maximizing markup on average
overtime. Fromthehousehold’spointofview,however,themarkupactslikea
taxonconsumptionandlaborsupplythatreduceswelfare. Therefore,thecen-
tral bank has an incentive to pursue expansionary monetary policy on behalf
of households to undo the markup tax. That temptation is greatest when the
central bank’s credibility for low inﬂation is most secure, since then employ-
ment can be expanded with little immediate increase in inﬂation or inﬂation
expectations. The problem is that by giving in to this temptation the central
bank undercuts its own credibility. If ﬁrms come to expect the markup to be
compressedpersistently, theywillraisepricestorestoretheproﬁtmaximizing
markup. Inﬂation and inﬂation expectations will rise, and the central bank
will lose credibility for low inﬂation. In short, credibility for low inﬂation
is fundamentally fragile in the new neoclassical synthesis because the pub-
lic recognizes the central bank’s temptation to pursue expansionary monetary
policy to depress the markup and expand employment.17
17 Barro and Gordon (1983), Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott (1989), and Sargent (1986) discuss
credibility issues in models other than those of the new neoclassical synthesis.M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 33
From time to time the public comes to doubt the central bank’s com-
mitment to low inﬂation. The history of monetary policy in the United States
containsnumerous“inﬂationscares”markedbysharplyrisinglong-termbond
rates reﬂecting increased expected inﬂation premia.18 Inﬂation scares create
a fundamental dilemma for monetary policy. At the initial nominal interest
rate target R, expected higher inﬂation lowers the implied real interest rate
target r = R − Eπ and exacerbates the inﬂation scare by stimulating current
demand and compressing the markup. The central bank could raise R just
enough to offset the effect of expected higher inﬂation on the real rate. How-
ever, neutralizingtheeffectofhigherinﬂationexpectationsontherealinterest
rate target does nothing to ﬁght the collapse of credibility itself.
If the inﬂation scare persists, a central bank must react by raising its real
interest rate target. That is, the central bank must raise R by more than the
increaseinEπ. Ahigherrealinterestratetargetcounteractstheinﬂationscare
bycontractingcurrentaggregatedemand,reducingemployment,loweringreal
wages, and widening the markup. According to (15), tight monetary policy
worksbyelevatingthecurrentandexpectedfuturemarkupsigniﬁcantlyabove
theproﬁtmaximizingmarkup. Inthecontractionaryenvironment, ﬁrmsmove
prices up more slowly than expected inﬂation, and expected inﬂation comes
down as credibility for low inﬂation is restored.
InﬂationscaresarecostlybecauseignoringthemorraisingR onlyenough
to cover the increase in Eπ can encourage even more doubt about the central
bank’s commitment to low inﬂation. But raising r to restore credibility for
low inﬂation only works by contracting employment, output, and consump-
tion to widen the markup signiﬁcantly and persistently enough to encourage
ﬁrms to slow the rate of inﬂation. For this reason, central banks have been
reluctant to react promptly to inﬂation scares. In the past such hesitation led
to“stagﬂation,” whenrisinginﬂationencouragedbyinsufﬁcientlypreemptive
policy would eventually be accompanied by a period of rising unemployment
after the central bank set out to restore its credibility for low inﬂation.
4. FLUCTUATIONSAND STABILIZATION POLICY
Inthissectionweconsiderthreeshocksthatcauseﬂuctuationsinemployment
and output because ﬁrms choose not to adjust prices to maintain markup con-
stancy. Againweassumethatthecentralbankhascredibilityforlowinﬂation.
InﬂationarysituationsAorBprevail, therearenoinﬂationscares, andthecur-
rent price level P is nearly invariant to current economic shocks and interest
rate policy actions. We consider the effects of optimism or pessimism about
future income prospects, a temporary productivity shock, and a shift in trend
18 See Goodfriend (1993) and Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998).34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
productivity growth. In each case we trace the effect of the shock holding the
central bank’s real interest rate target ﬁxed, then we consider how interest rate
policy might react to stabilize employment and inﬂation.
OptimismandPessimismaboutFutureIncomeProspects
According to the analysis of consumption in Section 1, a household plans
lifetimeconsumptiontosatisfy(3)andtoexhaustitslifetimebudgetconstraint
(1). Using these two conditions, we can write current aggregate demand c1 in









Since current output and income are demand determined when the price
level P is nearly invariant to current shocks and policy actions, we can set





According to (19), households transmit increased optimism or pessimism
about future income prospects y2 (whether in future wage or proﬁt income) to
current consumption, employment, and output. The reason is that households
want to allocate any expected change in lifetime resources to both current
and future consumption. Moreover, because current income is demand deter-
mined,thereisasecondary(multiplier)effectoncurrentincomethatampliﬁes
the initial impact of increased optimism or pessimism about the future. Both
the primary and secondary effects are captured in (19).
Although households react to increased optimism or pessimism by at-
tempting to borrow or lend in the credit market, ultimately any change in
current aggregate demand must be reﬂected in an equal change in current pro-
duction. Collectively, households cannot borrow from the future to consume
more in the present because it is impossible to bring goods forward in time.
Nor is it possible to store goods for future consumption in this benchmark
NNS model. However, the real interest rate does not react to conditions in
the credit market because the central bank intervenes by injecting or draining
cash to maintain its nominal interest rate target R. In so doing, interest rate
policy actually facilitates the transmission of optimism or pessimism about
the future to current employment and output.
In principle, interest rate policy can counteract the effect on current em-
ployment and output of increased optimism or pessimism about the future.
For instance, according to (19), a lower real interest rate target r can stabilize
current consumption, employment, and output against increased pessimism
about future income prospects. At best, however, stabilization policy can onlyM. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 35
be partially effective because it is difﬁcult to recognize shocks promptly and
because policy actions affect spending with a lag.
A Temporary Productivity Shock
Aggregate productivity grows on average over time as a result of technologi-
cal progress. However, productivity growth ﬂuctuates over time because the
invention and implementation of technological improvements do not occur
smoothly. We can think of a temporary shock to productivity as involving a
period in which productivity grows more rapidly or more slowly than its long-
run average, but is expected to return shortly to its long-run growth path. To
analyze the effect of a temporary productivity shock in the benchmark NNS
model, we abstract from trend productivity growth and consider a shortfall of
current productivity a1 with no effect on expected future productivity a2.
The adverse shock to current productivity expected to be temporary has
little effect on lifetime income prospects and, therefore, on current aggregate
demand. Hence, the negative productivity shock causes ﬁrms to hire more
labor to meet the initial demand. Real wages rise as ﬁrms bid for more labor.
Household wage income rises at the expense of proﬁt income, but aggregate
real income remains largely unchanged.
The markup is compressed directly because lower productivity raises
marginal cost and indirectly because the real wage is elevated. Firms are
inclined to raise prices to restore the proﬁt maximizing markup, but the price
level does not change much if the negative productivity shock is not too large
and is expected to be temporary.
Again the central bank can stabilize employment and inﬂation fully, in
principle. Accordingto(14)and(17),itdoessobyraisingtherealinterestrate
to contract current aggregate demand enough to stabilize the current markup
at µ∗. When the markup is stabilized, current output, income, consumption,
and the real wage all fall proportionally with productivity.
A Shift in Trend Productivity Growth
To understand the effect of shifting trend growth, suppose that current and
futureproductivityarerelatedbya2 = (1+g)·a1, whereg isthetrendgrowth
rate, and current productivity a1 is taken as given. Assume that interest rate
policy is expected to keep the actual markup at the proﬁt maximizing markup
in the future so that µ2 = µ∗. In this case, future income prospects vary
directly with the growth rate g since y2 = (1 + g)a1
1
1+µ∗.
Shifting trend productivity growth affects current variables in the same
way as changing optimism or pessimism about future income prospects. Sub-
stituting the above expression for y2 into (19), we see that for a given real
interest rate target r,current aggregate demand, output, and employment all36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
move in the same direction as the trend growth rate g. For instance, an in-
crease in trend growth raises current aggregate demand, raises current labor
demand, raises the real wage, and compresses the markup. Contrary to popu-
lar belief, an increase in trend productivity growth is inﬂationary at the initial
real interest rate target because it compresses the current markup.
According to (14) the central bank can stabilize the current markup, em-
ployment, and inﬂation against a shift in trend productivity growth by moving
itsrealinterestratetargetpointforpercentagepointwiththegrowthrateg.T o
see this, substitute (1 + g)a1 for a2 in (14) and note that r∗ =ρ + g.19 Higher
trend growth requires a higher real interest rate target to give households an
incentive not to consume the proceeds prematurely. Instead of providing a
reason to keep interest rates low, higher trend productivity growth actually
requires a higher real interest rate target on average over time to stabilize the
markup and maintain credibility for low inﬂation.
5. WELFARE MAXIMIZING MONETARY POLICY
The benchmark NNS model presented here recommends that interest rate
policy should stabilize the markup at its proﬁt maximizing level in order to
stabilizethepricelevelandmakeemploymentandoutputbehaveasinthecore
RBCmodelwithperfectlyﬂexibleprices. Therecommendedpolicyisreferred
to as “neutral” because it stabilizes the price level, neutralizes ﬂuctuations in
employment and output that would otherwise occur due to sticky prices, and
makes aggregate demand conform to ﬂuctuations in productivity as in a pure
real business cycle.
Neutralmonetarypolicyisrecommendedbecauseitmaximizeshousehold
welfare.20 This can be understood in four steps:
1) The central bank can only stabilize the markup at the value that max-
imizes ﬁrm proﬁts µ∗. Firm price adjustments will undo any attempt by the
central bank to move the markup permanently away from µ∗.
2) It is feasible for monetary policy to stabilize the markup at µ∗. Interest
rate policy can do so by making aggregate demand c conform to movements
in productivity a given the production technology c = an so as to stabilize
employment at n∗ = 1
1+µ∗.
3) Household labor supply ns is invariant to productivity a when the
markup is stabilized at its proﬁt maximizing value µ∗. A greater abun-
dance of consumption makes households want to take more leisure, but a
higher real wage raises the opportunity cost of leisure just enough to neutral-
ize the overall effect of productivity on desired labor supply. Thus, household
19 The approximate one-for-one correspondence is an implication of log utility.
20 Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001), Ireland (1996), and Woodford (2003).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 37
welfareismaximizedwhenconsumptionmoveswithproductivityattheproﬁt
maximizing markup.
4) Household welfare would be reduced if monetary policy were to allow
the markup µ to ﬂuctuate around the proﬁt maximizing markup µ∗. It is true
that households would be better off in periods when the markup tax is low.
But the markup tax would have to average as much time above as below µ∗ to
beconsistentwithﬁrmproﬁtmaximizationonaverageovertime. Withdimin-
ishing marginal utility, the utility gain from above average consumption and
leisure would be insufﬁcient to offset the utility loss from below average con-
sumption and leisure. Among other things, such logic means that interest rate
policy would reduce welfare if it moved the markup to smooth consumption
against productivity shocks.
The key characteristics of neutral monetary policy are these:
First, neutral policy stabilizes employment at the “natural rate,” n∗ =
1
1+µ∗.21 In effect, neutral policy enables the macroeconomy to operate as if
ﬁrms adjusted their prices costlessly and continuously to maintain the proﬁt
maximizing markup at all times.
Second,whenemploymentisstabilizedatthenaturalraten∗,actualoutput
moves with “potential output” y∗ = an∗, where potential output grows and
ﬂuctuatesovertimewithproductivitya. Inotherwords,neutralpolicyaimsto
eliminatethe“outputgap,” thedifferencebetweenactualandpotentialoutput.
Third, the consistent pursuit of neutral policy perpetuates low inﬂation
according to (15) if the central bank has already attained credibility for low
inﬂation by its past policy actions.
Fourth, lowinﬂationconfersanumberofbeneﬁtsinadditiontoitsconsis-
tency with neutral policy.22 For instance, low inﬂation produces low nominal
interest rates and less economization on the use of currency; low inﬂation
minimizes costly pricing decisions; low inﬂation minimizes relative price dis-
tortions; and low inﬂation guards against disruptive inﬂation scares.
Fifth, a central bank can implement neutral policy by maintaining price
stability. There is no need to target the proﬁt maximizing markup directly in
practice. The reason is that an economy in which ﬁrms show little inclination
to raise or lower prices on average is one in which the proﬁt maximizing
markup is realized on average.
Sixth, price stability can be maintained by consistently raising the real
interest rate target to preempt inﬂation and lowering it to preempt deﬂation.
In practice, interest rate policy should utilize measures of the output gap,
employment relative to the natural rate, and unit labor costs to help recognize
and preempt potential departures from price stability.23
21 Friedman (1968).
22 Khan, King, and Wolman (2003).
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Seventh, according to (14) the real interest rate target r that consistently
achieves price stability shadows the real interest rate r∗ that supports pure
real business cycles. Price stability must be maintained by activist interest
rate policy that makes aggregate demand conform to potential output to keep
µ = µ∗, and makes the real interest rate move with expected productivity
growth a2/a1.
Eighth, an inﬂation target facilitates the implementation of neutral mon-
etary policy in three ways.24 An inﬂation target mandated by the legislature
helps secure credibility for low inﬂation against the temptation to stimulate
employment excessively. A mandated target for low inﬂation reduces the in-
cidence of destabilizing inﬂation or deﬂation scares. And an inﬂation target
enablesthecentralbanktocutitsinterestrateinstrumentmoreaggressivelyto
stimulate economic activity when necessary without fear of an inﬂation scare.
6. CHALLENGES TO THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
According to the benchmark NNS model, credible price stability keeps output
at its potential and employment at its natural rate. So from this perspective
even those who care mainly about output and employment can support strict
inﬂation targeting. Yet the benchmark NNS model presented in this paper is
only one of many possible speciﬁcations of the new synthesis model. Taking
other features of the macroeconomy into account might overturn the strong
implicationthatpricestabilityisalwayswelfare-maximizingmonetarypolicy.
The purpose of this section is to consider brieﬂy three additional aspects of
the macroeconomy and whether they call for optimal departures from strict
inﬂation targeting.25
Nominal Wage Stickiness
Empirical studies of wage and price dynamics suggest that nominal wages
exhibit about the same degree of temporary rigidity as do nominal prices.26
Yet, nominal wages are perfectly ﬂexible in the benchmark NNS model and
are determined in perfectly competitive labor markets. So it is worth asking
to what extent nominal wage stickiness might overturn the strict inﬂation tar-
geting policy prescription. Consider a temporary adverse productivity shock.
With ﬂexible nominal wages, stabilization of the markup and the price level
24 Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), Haldane (1995), Leiderman and Svensson
(1995), and Svensson (1999).
25 Goodfriend and King (2001) consider a number of reasons to depart from perfect markup
constancy and price stability in an NNS model: fully dynamic multi-period pricing, distortions
involving monetized exchange, variable labor supply elasticities, and government spending shocks.
They argue that optimal departures arising from these sources are likely to be quantitatively minor.
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calls for aggregate demand to contract proportionally with productivity. At
the optimum, employment is unchanged because the markup is perfectly sta-
bilized. The nominal and the real wage both fall with productivity, exactly
offsetting the effect of lower productivity on marginal cost and the markup.
And the economy settles temporarily at the reduced potential output with a
perfectly stabilized price level.
Things don’t work out as neatly if nominal wages are sticky. In order to
maintain price stability, monetary policy must now steer output below poten-
tial. Monetary policy must push employment below the natural rate to offset
the adverse effect of lower productivity on marginal cost. This is possible be-
cause labor is more productive at the margin the less it is utilized, i.e., there is
diminishing marginal physical product of labor.27 In the presence of nominal
wage stickiness it is no longer feasible for monetary policy to both stabilize
the price level and keep output at potential. In principle, then, a negative
productivity shock could present the central bank with a short-run tradeoff
between price stability and output stability (relative to potential) when both
nominal wages and prices are sticky. In general, such a tradeoff would call
for a departure from strict inﬂation targeting.
Therearetworeasons,however,whysuchsituationsshouldbeofrelatively
little concern in practice. First, an inﬂation target between 1 and 2 percent
per year and trend productivity growth of around 2 percent produces average
nominal wage growth in the 3 to 4 percent range. Such high average nominal
wage growth should keep the economy safely away from situations in which
signiﬁcant downward nominal wage rigidity, as opposed to slower nominal
wage growth, is required to keep price inﬂation on target and output at its
potential.28 If the economy were to suffer a protracted productivity growth
slowdown, thenthecentralbankcouldsticktoitsinﬂationtargetandmaintain
markup constancy by allowing slower nominal wage growth to match the
slower productivity growth. Downward nominal wage stickiness should not
present a problem in this case. Upward nominal wage stickiness would not
causeproblemseither. Ifnominalwagesweretemporarilyrigid upwardinthe
face of a favorable productivity shock, then the central bank could stick to its
inﬂation target by steering the economy temporarily above potential output.
Second, implicit or explicit long-term relationships govern most labor
transactions in developed economies. For reasons analogous to those dis-
cussed in Section 2, it can be efﬁcient for ﬁrms to ﬁx nominal wages for a
period of time and to consider wage changes only at discrete intervals. Yet it
would be inefﬁcient for either ﬁrms or workers to allow temporary nominal
27 Production technology (7) is speciﬁed as linear in labor for expositional purposes only.
A more realistic speciﬁcation such as c = a(n)α, 1>α>0, would exhibit diminishing marginal
product of labor.
28Vinals (2001).40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
wage rigidity to upset the terms of otherwise efﬁcient long-term relationships.
And there is scope for ﬁrms and workers to neutralize the effect of wage
stickiness since wages already resemble installment payments in the context
of long-term relationships.29 Hence, ﬁrms and workers could be expected to
arrange future transactions to undo any effects of nominal wage stickiness.30
If the price level is stabilized in the face of a negative productivity shock,
those ﬁrms whose nominal wage is temporarily sticky will appear to pay an
excessive real wage. However, this logic suggests that non-adjusting ﬁrms
record a “due from” to be transferred from workers to the ﬁrm in the future.
In this way, “effective” real wages fall as much for ﬁrms that do not adjust
their nominal wages as for those ﬁrms that do adjust. To the extent that such
behavior is widespread, there is little reason to depart from strict inﬂation
targeting because nominal wages are sticky.31
From this perspective the consequences for monetary policy of stickiness
in wages and prices are sharply different. We can expect ﬁrms and work-
ers to neutralize the allocative consequences of temporarily sticky nominal
wages in the context of long-term relationships in the labor market. But spot
transactionspredominateinproductmarkets. There, temporarilystickyprices
can cause the average markup to ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly and persistently over
time with adverse consequences for employment and inﬂation. The adverse
consequences of temporarily sticky product prices need to be eliminated by
neutral monetary policy that supports price stability.
ExtremeAsset Price Fluctuations
Some analysts suggest that interest rate policy should react directly to asset
prices in order to preempt extreme ﬂuctuations such as those experienced in
Japan and the United States in recent years.32 They would urge a central
bank to take such action even if it has full credibility for low inﬂation. Such
advice amounts to a recommendation to risk recession or deﬂation in order
to preempt what may become an unsustainable increase in asset prices. It is
certainly debatable whether that risk would ever be worth taking.
Themainproblemwiththisrecommendation,however,isthatitisvirtually
impossible to put into practice.33 The reason boils down to this: When asset
prices ﬁrst appear to be surprisingly elevated, the central bank is disinclined
to react directly to them because asset prices are not yet so high as to be
29 Hall (1999).
30 Barro (1977).
31 Goodfriend and King (2001).
32 Interest rate policy ordinarily takes indirect account of asset prices in so far as they help
forecast aggregate demand.
33 Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Goodfriend (2003), and Greenspan (2002).M. Goodfriend: Monetary Policy Primer 41
clearly unsustainable. However, interest rate policy cannot react aggressively
to asset prices after they become clearly unsustainable either. At that point a
collapseofassetpricesitself,evenwithoutatighteningofpolicy,couldputthe
economy into recession. The best way to handle extreme ﬂuctuations in asset
prices is to make sure that supervisory and regulatory safeguards are in place
to prevent a precipitous asset price correction from immobilizing ﬁnancial
institutions and markets, and to make sure that monetary policy is sufﬁciently
sensitive to the risk of recession and deﬂation after a correction takes place.
The Zero Bound on Interest Rate Policy
This potential challenge to strict low inﬂation targeting stems from the fact
that nominal interest rates cannot go below zero because neither banks nor the
public will lend money at negative nominal interest when bank reserves and
currencyarecostlesstocarryovertime. Thezeroboundonnominalinterestis
apotentialproblemformonetarypolicyinalowinﬂationenvironmentfortwo
main reasons. First, if expected inﬂation is nearly zero, then the central bank
cannot make real short-term interest negative if need be to ﬁght deﬂationary
shocks. Second, when short-term nominal rates are zero, further disinﬂation
raises real short-term interest rates and worsens the deﬂationary pressure.
One could keep nominal short-term interest rates safely away from zero
bytargetinginﬂationat3or4percentperannum; butthatwouldmeanaccept-
ing the costs of excessive inﬂation forever. Moreover, such a high inﬂation
target would invite credibility problems. An inﬂation target between 1 and 2
percent is a good compromise. Inﬂation is kept low, but far enough from zero
to avoid deﬂation. One could conceivably raise the inﬂation target temporar-
ily whenever more leeway for negative real interest was thought necessary to
ﬁght a recession. However, a policy that resorted to higher inﬂation in such
circumstances would cause inﬂation expectations to rise whenever the econ-
omy weakened. Variable inﬂation expectations would be difﬁcult to manage.
Inﬂationscareswouldagainbecomeasigniﬁcantsourceofshockstotheecon-
omy. Strictly targeting inﬂation between 1 and 2 percent could ﬁrmly anchor
expected inﬂation and still give a central bank leeway to push the real short-
term rate 1 to 2 percentage points below zero. Evidence from U.S. monetary
history suggests that such leeway would be enough to enable a central bank to
preempt deﬂation and stabilize the economy against most adverse shocks.34
Moreover, other effective monetary policy options are available if short-term
nominal rates become immobilized at the zero bound.35
34 Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Vinals (2001).





policy. For almost two decades low and relatively stable inﬂation around the
world has proved its worth. In the United States the period included the two
longest peacetime cyclical expansions and two mild recessions in 1990–91
and in 2001. The benchmark new neoclassical synthesis model provides a
theoreticalcaseforpricestabilitythatsupportsthepracticalcasederivedfrom
experience. Theory reinforces practice and strengthens the view that price
stability should be a priority for monetary policy.
The benchmark NNS model explains why price stability works well, and
why price stability is desirable from the perspective of household welfare.
A credible commitment to low inﬂation prevents inﬂation or deﬂation scares
that are destabilizing for both output and prices. Price stability is welfare-
maximizing monetary policy because it anchors the markup at its proﬁt maxi-
mizing value and thereby prevents ﬂuctuations in employment and output that
would otherwise occur due to sticky prices.
As an operational matter we saw how interest rate policy actions work
to implement price stability by stabilizing the markup, and how interest rate
policy secures credibility for low inﬂation. By anchoring expected future
inﬂation we saw how such credibility strengthens the leverage that interest
rate policy exerts over current aggregate demand. In so doing, credibility
for low inﬂation helps monetary policy make aggregate demand conform to
movements in potential output.
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